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Financial Deregulation: It's Been Good for Us, 

But What Has It All Been About 

And, Is It Over? " 

Financial deregulation could turn out 
to be a will-d -the wisp. By the time, many 
figure out what is happening, it could be 
over, and there could be talk of reregula­
tion. Let's look back to see what finan­
cial deregulation was, why it occurred, 
and what is left. 
Only ten years ago, if you wanted a 
safe, relatively liquid, interest-bearing as­
set for reserves, you went to your local 
bank or savings and loan association and 
received 5 or 5.5% in a passbook sav­
ings account. Now, however, there are 
any number of financial institutions with 
which to deal, and there is a large array 
of possible instruments, each with its own 
interest rate. 
A number of forces have converged 
on the banking and financial systems in 
the last 10-15 years, and while they often 
go under the rubric "deregulation;' dereg­
ulation was really the follower of these 
events rather than the leader. Deregula­
tion meant that the Federal government 
and its agencies loosened control over 
depository financial institutions (OFl's) 
such as commercial banks and thrift in­
stitutions (savings and loans and mutual 
savings banks) and allowed them to 
engage in business practices that they 
were not authorized to do before-setting 
price structures, raising funds from dif­
ferent sources, developing new "prod­
ucts" and moving into different markets. 
Prior to these developments, banks 
and thrifts had been among the most 
regulated businesses. For the past ten 
years or so, however, this has been chang­
ing. Why did the government loosen its 
grip on what OFf's could or could not do? 
Power is not given up lightly. 
Why Deregulation Happened 
It was not out of the goodness of their 
hearts that government bureaucrats final­
ly said, "Let the market do it." It was a 
set of circumstances that came together 
and brought home that message. What 
were these circumstances? 
The forces that brought about the 
massive change we have seen in the 
financial system, and that we loosely refer 
to as deregulation, were the products of 
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ing inflation, high and volatile interest 
rates, technological change, institutional 
change, increased competition, and in­
creased financial sophistication on the 
part of consumers. To be sure, one could 
argue that the increased financial sophis­
tication was brought about, to some extent, 
by the other forces-was, indeed, made 
necessary by them. Nonetheless, these 
other influences were very real and very 
powerful. 
Throughout the post-war period, com­
puters, perhaps the epitome of techno­
logical change, were improving rapidly in 
capacity and speed and declining in price. 
Their impact was increasingly felt in the 
financial system, where the need was 
heaviest for the ability to store large 
This volatile, unprecedented inflation 
brought about and was mirrored in similar 
behavior in interest rates. Treasury-bill 
rates rose from 5% in early 1977 to over 
15% in 1980. After falling back sharply 
to 7% for a very brief period in the mid­
1980's, Treasury-bill rates peaked at over 
16% in 1981. 
As if the volatility of interest rates (and 
of stock and bond prices, for that matter) 
wasn't enough, much of the period since 
the late 1960's on saw interest rates on 
highly liqUid, short-term, safe securities, 
like U.S. Treasury bills exceed the max­
imum rates the Government agencies 
allowed the banks and thrifts to pay on 
savings accounts. At times, the margin 
was ten percentage points. Those max-
Why did the government loosen its grip on what 
DFl's could or could not do? 
Power is not given up lightly. •amounts of data and swap it between ac­
counts. This development eventually led 
to the introduction of accounts at DFI's, 
whereby depOSitors maintained zero 
balances in their checking accounts until 
checks were presented for collection. At 
that point, the computer moved the 
depositor's funds out of interest-bearing 
savings and into the checking account in 
the right amount at the right time to cover 
checks presently against the account. 
This was the NOW account-Negotiable 
Order of Withdrawal account. It was, in 
fact, an interest-bearing checking ac­
count. It was something that banks had 
not been legally able to offer since the 
Banking Act of 1935. This development 
made some deregulation inevitable. 
The Inflation Roller Coaster 
But there were other forces at work as 
well. Inflation, for instance, increased to 
over 12% in 1974, then fell to 4.8% in 
1976, and accelerated back up to over 
13% in 1979. It has since fallen to less 
than 4%. This inflation roller coaster brought 
about massive change in the financial sys­
tem as well as in other parts of the econ­
omy as people attempted to protect their 
imum rates became known as Regulation 
Q because they fell under the Federal 
Reserve's Regulation Q. 
The high money market rates, former­
ly available only to big investors, prompt­
ed small savers to get a piece of the ac­
tion. As expected, the market respond­
ed. Not only did new types of depOSits 
and securities appear but new institutions 
emerged as well. Money market mutual 
funds came on the financial scene and 
prOVided savers with convenient, safe, li­
qUid ways to earn the high rates on T­
bills, certificates of deposit, commercial 
paper, and other short-term securities, 
which heretofore small savers otherwise 
couldn't touch due to the high denomina­
tions involved (usually $100,000 and up). 
From Savings Accounts 
To Money Market Accounts 
Not surprisingly, savers reacted to the 
high rates and new alternatives by pull­
ing funds out of low-yielding savings ac­
counts in OFl's in droves. This became 
known as "disintermediation;' and it oc­
curred every time market Interest rates •went significantly above the Regulation 
the 1970's and early 1980's: high and ris- assets and incomes from being ravaged. Q ceiling rates. A major part of these 
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withdrawals went to the "money funds:' 
Balances in money-market funds shot up 
from less than $4 billion in 1977 to well 
over $200 billion in 1982. Finally, the 
complaints of banks and thrifts were 
heard by the regulators, and in 1982 they 
allowed the DF1's to offer their own brand 
new Money Market Deposit Accounts 
(MMDA's) on which they could pay the 
higher market rates and attract deposits. 
That deregulation was in the form of a 
new Federal law-the Garn-Sf. Germain 
Act of 1982. Balances in MMDA's prompt­
ly went from zero in August 1982 to over 
$320 billion by the end of March 1983 
-a massive consumer response to the 
most successful financial innovation ever. 
The 1982 Act also authorized savings and 
loans to accept deposits from, and make 
loans to, businesses, and it allowed the 
thrift institutions to increase their con­
sumer lending. 
The gyrations and record levels of in­
terest rates alarmed consumers and busi­
nesses alike, and by the time the prime 
rate passed 19% in late 1979, almost 
everyone, both in and out of government, 
decided that something had to be done. 
What had to happen, among other 
things, was deregulation. This process of 
financial reform that had been in progress 
for several years culminated in the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). 
DIDMCA was the most massive change 
in our financial structure since the bank­
ing reforms of the early 1930's. Among 
other things, it mandated the phasing-out 
of all interest rate ceilings on all deposits 
at DF1's by April 1986. It authorized NOW 
accounts on a nationwide basis for all 
DFI's. And it pre-exempted or wiped out 
state usury laws on consumer-type and 
mortgage loans unless the states affected 
specifically re-enacted the laws. And 
there was still more deregulation. 
In 1983, interest rate ceilings were 
removed from the rest of the time de­
posits at DFl's, and super NOW's came 
in. The latter carry market rates and have 
unlimited checking privileges but can 
have relatively high minimum balances. 
Competition in the Market 
Another force working for deregula­
tion at times, but resulting from deregula­
tion at other times, was increased com­
petition in the various financial markets. 
Other companies invaded the banking 
field. The cash management account 
(CMA) at brokerage firms is a prime ex­
ample. Soon, banks decided they too 
wanted to be brokers, as did S & I..:s. 
Then some S & I..:s decided to become 
banks, and some banks wanted to ac­
quire insurance companies. It seemed 
that every financial institution wanted to 
offer every financial service, a far cry from 
the days when only banks issued check­
ing accounts and made unsecured busi­
ness loans, and S & I..:s issued only sav­
ings accounts and made home mortgage 
loans. And that wasn't aiL Non-finimcial 
companies wanted a piece of the finan­
cial action. Sears got into brokerage, and 
a steel company got into banking. In 
short, the financial players all wanted to 
play in each other's back yard: 
The next big move was to open up 
shop in someone else's market, some­
times even crossing state lines-another 
taboo that banks and S & I..:s had lived 
with for years. The regulatory restraints 
on interstate banking started to crumble, 
a Process which is still going on.. 
The factors we have cited have forced 
massive change on the financial system 
-in fact, the largest since the cataclysmic 
changes that took place after the collapse 
of the financial system in the early 1930's 
in the early years of the Depression. 
Then, in response to the thousands of 
banks and other financial institutions that 
went under, Congress enacted laws and 
formed agencies and programs to correct 
the problems that supposedly led up to 
the crash, and to prevent its reoccurrence. 
Summary of Change 
Eventually, it was these reforms that 
put the DFl's into the straitjackets that 
finally were broken a half century later by 
the forces cited above: high and volatile 
inflation and interest rates, technological 
change, increased competition, and in­
stitutional change. In time, the banks and 
thrifts found that they had to avoid and 
circumvent government regulations or be 
left behind to stagnate. The combination 
of these events forced the hand of the 
government regulators, and what unfold­
ed was deregulation. 
The reduction in the heavy hand of 
government regulation came sporadically 
and in several forms. There was deregula­
tion of pricing, of products offered, and 
of entry into geographical markets. Pric­
ing deregulation means the removal of 
many of the interest rate ceilings DFl's 
paid on depOSits and charged on loans. 
Although some state usury laws still re­
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main, all Federal interest rate ceilings wer"­
done away with in April 1986. Individ~ 
als can now receive, and pay, rates set by 
the market rather than by government 
agencies. 
The products of DFI's are primarily the 
types of loans they make and the types 
of deposits they accept. While banks have 
had wide asset powers for years and have 
made most kinds of loans-from con­
sumer loans, to business, agricultural, and 
security loans-the thrifts, especially the 
S & I..:s, had very restricted loan powers. 
That has now changed. They too can 
make many types of consumer and 
business loans as well as their traditional 
fixed-rate home mortgage loans. In some 
states, S & I..:s have wider asset powers 
than do commercial banks. 
On the deposit side, there have been 
changes too. Both kinds of DFI's can now 
offer many types of depOSits that didn't 
exist a dozen years ago. Today there are 
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal, NOW 
accounts, Super-NOW's, MMDA's and 
time deposits with numerous maturities 
up to eight years and more. The thrifts 
can also now offer checking accounts tqA 
the pUblic. ., 
Geographical and market deregulation 
has come more slowly and more sporad­
ically than the other types, but it has been 
equally complex. Many of the geograph­
ical and market entries have been through 
merger, whereby a bank or S & L in one 
state buys a bank or S & L in another 
state. But the action hasn't been limited 
to mergers among like institutions. Banks 
have acquired S & I..:s and S & I..:s have 
acquired banks, and both have been ac­
quired by companies that are neither 
banks nor thrifts. 
The Future of Deregulation 
There is one strand left in the fabric of 
deregulation. That is nationwide banking. 
The odds are that we will see Citibank 
and the offices of other out-of-town banks 
in west Michigan in a few years. Aside 
from that, the types of deregulation that 
were possible have occurred. 
The cycle of deregulation is not over, 
however. We are seeing increased bank 
and thrift failures due to excesses, poor 
judgment, adverse markets, and the Iikee 
While some of that was to be expected, 
it may also mean that deregulation may 
have gone too far. But that's another 
story. 
